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IN THE SUPREME COURT
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)
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corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DELORES ANN GALLEGOS, by and
through her Guardian ad Litem,
Fidel Gallegos, and FIDEL
GALLEGOS I
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
MIDVALE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

)

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
12312

)

)
)

)

)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPLEMENT TO
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
As an addendum to Point II of plaintiff's
brief, we take the position that even though a
Proper verified claim was not submitted to the city
30 days as required by u.c.A. 1953, Section·
10-7-77, plaintiff• s action should not be barred
in view of the fact that plaintiff was a minor
two years of age, and incapable of protecting her own rights.
In other words, even if this
-1-

court should determine that the parking strip is
a part of the street rather than the sidewalk, we
believe that U.C.A. 1953, Section 10-7-77 should
not be held to foreclose the action.
At the trial when counsel for plaintiff
argued that Section 10-7-77 was inapplicable in
view of plaintiff's tender age, defendant cited
the case of Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589,
228 P. 213 as being determinative on the issue.
The decision was written in 1924. The Court held
that the claim of an eight year old was barred
for failure to file a verified claim within the
specified 30 days. we urged then and we now urge
that the Hurley case is wrong, that it is harsh
and unjust, and that it should be reversed.
We submit that there is respectable
authority to support our position. An annotation
found at 35 A.L.R. 2d 725, 736 states:
"Compliance with notice requirements
has been held excused in several cases
involving infants, principally on the
ground that an inf ant is incapable of
complying with the notice requirement
and has no power to appoint an agent
or attorney to do so for him."
Many cases cited in the annotation hold
that a minor child should not be held to the time
requirements of statutes of limitations and there
is absolutely no reason why the 30 day requirement
of Section 10-7-77 should ·be considered in any
different vein than that of any other statute of
limitations.
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We call attention to the fact that it
is not uncorrunon for this Court to reverse prior
decisions in cases where justice demands such
reversal.
This inherent power of the Court has
been asserted not only in general decisional law
but in cases involving interpretations of statutes.
The latest of such cases is Worthen v. Shurtleff
and Andrews, Inc., and the Dept. of Finance, 19
Utah 2d 80, 426 P.2d 223, a case which involved
the interpretation of a Workman's Compensation
Statute pertaining to payment of attorneys fees.
The prior case of McConnell v. Commission of Financ•
13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P.2d 394 would have defeated
plaintiff's claim. This Court decided to reverse
McConnell in the interest of justice, and in so
doing stated:
"We have so concluded cognizant of
McConnell v. Corrunission of Finance,
13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P.2d 394, in
which the insurance carrier was not
made a party, but in so far as this
case may be inconsistent with McConnell, that case is overruled."
The Supreme Court of the United States
has likewise recognized its inherent power to reverse a prior decision. One of the most wellknown instances in which that high court reversed
itself was in the case of Brown v. Board of Edu§tion of Topeka, 74 s.ct. 686 where the Court
stated:
"In approaching this problem, we
cannot turn the clock back to 1868
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when the Amendment was adopted, or
even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson
was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full
development and its present place
in American life throughout the Nation."

***
"Whatever may have been the extent
of psychological knowledge at the
time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this
finding is amply supported by modern
authority. Any language in Plessy
v. Ferguson contrary to this finding
is rejected."
In the case at bar, a two year old minor
has lost most of the sight of her eye as a result
of an accident. To deny her the right to recover
damages for such a tragedy because her parents
did not pursue a technical notice requirement
would be an unthinkable travesty of justice.
We take the position that defendant
should be estopped from claiming that a verified
claim should have been filed within 30 days of
the accident. This Court should clea'rly face the
realism that a two year old child is incapable of
its own rights, and that it is more
important that our Courts protect the child than
that they protect a purely technical right of a
municipality. This is particularly true where,
as here, the record affirmatively shows that the
City suffered no prejudice whatsoever from a
8 light delay.
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We are reminded of the language of Oliver
Swift in Gulliver's Travels:
"It is a maxim among lawyers, that
whatever hath been done before, may
legally be done again; and therefore they take special care to record
all the decisions formerly made against
common justice and the general reason
of mankind. These, under the name of
precedents, they produce as authorities
to justify the most iniquitous opinions;
and the judges never fail to direct
accordingly."
We are pleased that within our own Court
system the criticism of Swift is inapplicable. We
ask this Honorable Court in the spirit of Worthen
to strike down the Hurley case and to hold that
the thirty day notice requirement of Section 10-7-7
does not defeat the claim of a two year old child.
We do this in the interest of justice.

Rawlings, Roberts & Black
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
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